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Mr>€hairman, . 
I appreciate the invitation to testify before your Commission. 
I am here to suggest an alternative to the employer controlled arbitration procedures 
spawned since the Gilmer decision. Although I became President of the National Academy 
of Arbitrators in May, I am speaking here as an individual, albeit with the approval of the 
Executive Committee of the Academy. The Academy has not taken any official position on 
the Report or on my proposal for arbitration of statutory enforcement issues. Thus the views 
expressed here and in my proposal are personal. I should emphasize that the Academy 
has retained it's historic 47 year commitment the union-management relationship while 
recognizing the right of its members to engage in dispute settlement work outside that 
union-management relationship. We recently reiterated our policy of considering only union 
management acceptability as the benchmark for Academy admission but have recognized 
our obligation to provide the training which members require for work in related 
employment fields. 
I have read your May Report and noted your endorsement of the due process standards 
that have so long driven the labor management model of arbitration. Arbitration in the labor-
management field has certainly been shaped by the parties to meet their needs. I 
recognize that the needs of the parties in the statutory dispute settlement field will be quite 
different in many respects, and it is for those parties to likewise shape an arbitration system 
to their mutual need and benefit. I offer the attached proposal to suggest that many of the 
due process attributes of our private labor-management system might have some appeal to 
the participants in this new and expanding field for resolving through arbitration, the spate 
of pending statutory enforcement issues described in your Report. 
It should be emphasized that this proposal is not to duplicate the current union-
management arbitration structure. Nor indeed is it a structure for union avoidance. It is 
equally apposite to the unionized and non-unionized sectors. It has no relation to the use of 
arbitration in so called union-avoidance schemes. It is a merely a structure for the narrow 
purpose of resolving the flood of unresolved statutory enforcement issues the Report 
identified as plaguing the dispute settlement field and as threatening to engulf both the 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary. 
It should also be emphasized that this is not an effort to create an expanded work load for 
the present cadre of labor management arbitrators. First, it is painfully clear that the current 
cadre of labor management arbitrators may not be the arbitrators of choice for the new 
procedures We are viewed by many as being too ignorant of the law and too wedded to 
the collective bargaining standard of "just cause" to be acceptable for statutory enforcement 
issues on the standards expected by the agencies and the courts. Second, many of us 
lack both the interest and commitment to venture into this new field of statutory 
responsibility, and are content to stick to our labor management knitting without risking the 
agency or court reversals that might come with ventures into this new maze. Third, we lack 
the qualifications that many of the new users may seek. Approximately half of the NAA 
members are not lawyers, and we lack sufficient female and minority arbitrators to meet the 
expected qualifications for resolving the anticipated volume of sex and race and ethnic 
discrimination issues. But the needs of the new players (as was true of the needs of the 
original labor management parties) may lead them to develop a wholly different roster of 
acceptable arbitrators. Indeed, If adopted, this proposal may lead to an entirely new 
generation of neutrals quite different from what the public currently perceives as being the 
society's labor arbitrators. Thus it is the tradition of the adversaries in the labor 
management field having developed their own structure of private arbitration in the labor 
management field, that leads me to suggest that a similar system of privatized arbitration 
might likewise be shaped by the parties in this new employment law field. 
In developing the attached proposal, I have received comments and suggestions from a 
number of groups concerned with the problem. In fact, after discussions with the Council of 
the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association at its Convention 
in New Orleans in August, the Council established a special Task Force to further explore 
the development of a mutually acceptable procedure for resolving these and other 
workplace disputes. That task force including the representatives of the FMCS, SPIDR, 
ACLU, AAA and me from the NAA. We met last week in New York City in recognition of the 
need for developing such privatized machinery and to develop a plan for discussing 
procedures for most effectively resolving, with due process, the whole range of work place 
and related disputes. That is not a closed group, and we would welcome input from any 
other groups seeking to develop fair and effective dispute settlement machinery for these 
troublesome problems. 
I have attached to this statement a revised draft of my proposal. I do,not intend to read it, but 
I would like to highlight some of its elements. The proposal anticipates government 
encouragement of voluntary, enterprise based private arbitration structures with due 
process protections for the resolution of statutory employment rights. Such procedures may 
be self developed by employers (perhaps with the participation of employee groups), or be 
provided by existing dispute settlement organizations such as the American Arbitration 
Association. The selection of the neutral arbitrators would be by the parties to the individual 
dispute from a panel provided by a neutral designating agency . The arbitrators panel card 
would list the prior training of the arbitrator in the legal issues involved as well as the 
parties to recent cases decided by the arbitrator. It proposes to expand the roster from 
which the panels are drawn to increase the numbers of females and minorities to make it 
more demographically representative. Claimants would have the right to representatives of 
their choice, and the arbitrator would have the authority to provide remedies similar to those 
provided by the courts, including the award of attorney's fees. Arbitrators would be paid by 
the designating agency. The funds would be collected from the employer, the claimant, and 
perhaps outside sources such as the statutory agencies from the money saved from 
enforcement costs. The decision of the arbitrator would be final following the model used by 
the NLRB under its Spielberg doctrine 
Greater detail is set forth in the attached document. I offer this outline to suggest that a system 
providing due process to claimants in a private, voluntary, dispute settlement system is 
attainable. If adopted by the participants concerned, with the encouragement of the 
government, it may help to bring inexpensive, rapid and equitable dispute resolution to this 
troubled area of employment law. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 
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PROPOSAL for ARBITRATION of STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
Arnold M. Zack 
For every complex problem, there is a solution that is short, simple, and probably wrong.-H. L Mencken 
01. Summary 
The Gilmer decision has encouraged employers to establish arbitration systems for 
administrative resolution of statutory obligations. Such systems have tended to preclude the 
employee's traditional access to the due process and fairness of judicial appeal. The 
employer's unilateral establishment of such systems raises issues of equity as well as 
issues as to the impartiality of the selected arbitrators. It also threatens the credibility and 
integrity of arbitrators and arbitration in the labor-management forum as created and 
monitored by unions and employers over the decades. This is a proposal to increase the 
prospect of due process and fairness in the arbitration of employment disputes using 
mutually selected arbitrators, to assure the preservation of the high standards and 
acceptability of arbitration in both unionized and non-unionized settings. If acceptable to 
government agencies, the courts, and the participants, it might extend to a deferral system for 
a wide range of statutory enforcement areas helping to relieve the courts of their heavy 
burden, while providing a more accessible and less expensive system of dispute resolution 
for covered employees. 
2. Present system 
At present some 95% of collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of 
disputes over the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements. 
Traditionally, the jurisdiction of the arbitrators is restricted to the terms of the agreement. 
Although arbitrators do venture into the interpretation and application of pertinent statutes, 
administrative agencies and the courts have been disinclined to cede to arbitrator's 
jurisdiction over statutory interpretation and enforcement. Arbitrator deferral under the NLRA 
functions in that context, and in Alexander v. Gardner Denver the Supreme Court expressed 
respect for the arbitrators factual determinations while asserting its exclusive authority over 
statutory application. 
The expansion of legislation protecting employees, particularly in the areas of 
discrimination, has had an impact on the entire work force, and not merely the 15 percent 
who operate under collective bargaining agreements. The legislative encouragement of 
alternative dispute resolution to resolve disputes in lieu of litigation has led an estimated 
"100 big companies' employers" in the last three years1 to develop their own administrative 
procedures. These are intended to pressure, if not to require, employees with claims of 
statutory violation to sign away the right to bring such cases before a judge and jury by 
agreeing to arbitrate their disputes. A Wall Street Journal Article on June 9, 1994 describing 
required arbitration of a sex harassment complaint in the securities industry pointed to the 
employer's control of the process, its unilateral appointment of security managers as 
arbitrators, its failure to follow fair procedures and the arbitrators disregard of prevailing 
standards of the law. It cited the references to arbitration as "industry fraud" and a "rigged 
game." The prospect of such employer promulgated schemes eroding the credibility of labor-
Required Job-Bias Arbitration Stirs Critics, Wall Street Journal. June 22, 1994. 
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management arbitration is real as the complaints that the employer controlled arbitration 
systems "are mounting^ 
There is need to protect the rights of the nation's 120 million workers by assuring a fair 
procedure with due process for the prompt resolution of claims of violation of statutory 
protections. There is need to bring together the affected constituencies to develop a fair 
means of resolving such disputes at a price workers can afford. Such fairness should entail 
among other elements, a right of employee representation, provision for jointly selected 
trained and qualified neutrals, and the encouragement of worker-management efforts to 
facilitate reduction of such conflict as a means of enhancing productivity and workplace 
cooperation. 
It should be emphasized that this proposal for arbitration as an alternative to litigation 
is confined to complaints of statutory violation. Such approach must be distinguished from 
arbitration as a means of resolving questions of contract interpretation and application in the 
context of enforceable collective bargaining agreements. At present, arbitrators of collective 
bargaining disputes tend to confine themselves to the terms of the parties agreement. As 
noted above, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, has declined to defer to 
collective bargaining arbitrators on matters of statutory application. In that case the arbitrator 
had not been authorized to resolve the statutory issue. If that decision is reversed, or if 
Section 1 of the US Arbitration Act is interpreted or amended to extend arbitrator authority 
into collective bargaining situations, then there would also be need to reexamine the present 
practice of union control over appeal to arbitration, and to extend that right to individual 
employees in statutory right cases, even where there may be a union. 
What follows is a proposed approach to resolving problems of statutory enforcement 
through arbitration in the vast majority of non-unionized workplaces , although its adoption is 
also appropriate in unionized environments. 
3. Administrative and Legislative Framework 
At present there are three employment statutes which specifically encourage the use 
of ADR to resolve claims of statutory violation: Americans with Disabilities Act, Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Title 7 of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act also encourages such procedure. Additionally, arbitration of security 
industry disputes has been extended to job discrimination matters. Discrimination complaints 
are often appealed to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. However, under 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver. Section 1 of the U.S. Arbitration Act has been considered to 
bar a Gilmer-like deferral to arbitration of statutory complaints raised under collective 
bargaining agreements. It would presumably take an expanded decision by the Court or a 
legislative change to extend Gilmer-tvpe arbitration authority to enforcement of other 
discrimination complaints based on race, sex, etc. as currently handled by the EEOC. This 
proposal anticipates that there will be expanded resort to arbitration in non-collective 




 Presumably, if Gilmer is extended to apply to collective bargaining agreements, then the negotiated arbitration 
arrangements will apply, authorizing binding arbitral decisions of statutory claims. Employees under collective 
bargaining agreements should have the individual right to appeal their statutory enforcement cases to such binding 
arbitration. This might require modification of the general rule that the union controls the right of appeal to the 
arbitration step as well as of the traditional standard that the cost of arbitration be shared equally between union and 
management. 
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In order to assure an equitable procedure, agencies responsible for statutory 
enforcement might promulgate regulations requiring that employer-created arbitration 
procedures adhere to certain due process requirements. This might be accomplished by a 
general mandate calling for due process procedures or through listing specific due process 
requirements such as a. voluntary employee access to the plan, b. the right to select 
representatives of the employees own choosing, c. availability of some form of discovery to 
minimize multi-day hearings, d. designation of arbitrators either by a neutral agency or from 
a neutral pool, e. written arbitration opinions, f. arbitrator cost sharing standards, g. 
entitlement to damages, attorney fees, etc. 
Additionally the regulations might encourage joint development of such procedures 
by employers with committees of employees.4 The regulations might provide more favorable 
conditions, such as exemption from liability for employee's attorney fees in case of appeal, 
varying burdens of proof or adjustment of appeal deadlines for employers including 
employee representation in the development of the procedures. 
Employers would have discretion to develop their own arbitration procedures, without 
the requirement of prior approval of the agency involved. Adherence to general due process 
or specifically required standards would be a prerequisite to agency or court acceptance of 
the arbitrators awards. Claimants would have the right on appeal to challenge the propriety 
of the employers plan in the light of the agency regulations. Employers might also embrace 
plans developed by the designating agencies. The governmental agency or court would 
then have the option of determining whether the procedure and arbitration decision was in 
compliance with the regulations and if not, of vitiating the award and permitting a de novo 
proceeding before the agency or court. There might of course be areas where the agency 
might wish to establish legal precedents by processing cases to court review. Penalty 
provisions for successful challenge to the fairness of the employers plans might encourage 
employers to embrace the recommended due process standards or to encourage employee 
committee participation in the development and administration of such plans. 
4. Employer Created Plans 
This proposal endorses the current practice of employers unilaterally establishing 
dispute settlement procedures (although not embracing a commitment to arbitration as a 
precondition for hiring). Employer promulgation of a voluntary arbitration system would 
encourage on-going adaptability of such plans to meet changing standards and regulations 
without the administrative burden of having to register or certify the plan, or being barred 
from changing the plan without agency acquiescence. It would also substantially reduce the 
cost of the system, avoiding the bureaucracy inherent in administering, or challenging, such 
certifications and filings. But the proposal also encourages the inclusion of employee 
representatives in developing and jointly administering the system by relieving the employer 
of certain burdens, or time constraints. Plans which provide protections beyond those 
mandated by the regulations might also be entitled to favored treatment, as might employer 
acceptance of plans established by designating agencies. 
Employers who developed plans which meet or exceed the requirement of the 
regulations would be more likely to have endorsement of arbitrators awards rendered 
thereunder. Those which do not meet the agency requirements of fairness and due process 
would risk appeals which might overturn their procedures, bring de novo litigation of the 
claim, with potentially costly jury awards. 
with an exemption from Section 8a2 of the NLRA 
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5. Arbitrator Involvement 
Of greatest concern to those worried about the spill over impact of self-serving 
employer systems on the credibility of truly impartial arbitration is access to qualified and 
unbiased arbitrators. That can not be achieved if the employer is entitled to designate its 
choice of who is to be the arbitrator. Nor can it be achieved by allocating all cases to the 
present cadre of labor-management arbitrators. Numerous problems must be addressed in 
assuring the neutrality, professional competence, and acceptability of the arbitrators in such 
plans. 
a. Arbitrator Pool 
Individual neutral designating agencies might opt to create their own rosters of 
neutrals for selection in such disputes. Alternatively, to assure the broadest pool of 
experienced professional arbitrators, it is proposed to combine the rosters of all participating 
designating agencies into a single pool. This would embrace all those who are currently 
engaged in the practice of employment and labor-management arbitration, and those who 
have had sufficient acceptability to be admitted to such rosters. Presumably many of the 
professional arbitrators are currently on more than one such roster. Such a pool would 
presumably number upward of 5000 names nationally, although admittedly largely those 
working as labor-management neutrals. Rapid expansion of that pool is essential. 
Recognition by the government agencies that the pool constitutes an acceptable body of 
experienced employment arbitrators would place at a disadvantage and risk of overturning 
their systems, those employers who designate arbitrators without such credentials. 
Admission to the pool could be achieved on the same basis as presently required for 
acceptance to any designating agency roster. Once an individual is accepted to an agency 
roster the arbitrator would be automatically enrolled in the pool. Designating agencies would 
embrace the pool listings, and draw the panels from their own rosters or from that pool when 
so requested by a plan. The size of the individual panel would be determined by the 
employer plan. Alternatively, the employer's procedure might call for appointment of an 
arbitrator by the designating agency directly, foregoing resort to panel selection. 
It is recommended that the pool not be restricted to lawyers. It is true that the burdens 
imposed on the arbitrators will require application of, and conformity to, statutes and 
regulations, and that endorsement of arbitral decisions will be dependent on compliance to 
legal standards. But some of the most renowned arbitrators, with the sharpest legal minds 
are not members of the bar. It would be unfortunate to lose access to experienced non-
lawyer arbitrators with extensive employment law experience . 
b. Arbitrator Qualification 
The effectiveness of this proposed system is dependent on providing qualified and 
acceptable arbitrators. The credibility of such a private alternative to statutory entitlement 
requires that the arbitrators be knowledgeable of the governing regulations and statutes and 
court decisions. It can only provide an effective alternative to the courts, or meet the courts' 
goal of reducing the flood of potential litigation if the arbitrators have the requisite knowledge 
of statute and regulation to assure the proceedings meet the test of judicial equivalency. It 
also requires that the parties have faith in the neutrality of the arbitrator, and some knowledge 
or the arbitrator's prior awards. 
Most labor-management arbitrators today do not have the requisite familiarity with 
pertinent statutes or court decisions to provide a credible alternative to litigation. 
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Experience in labor-management arbitration is largely confined to the Interpretation of 
collective bargaining agreements and application of the so-called "law of the shop", as 
distinguished from the law of the land. Many such arbitrators have been involved in applying 
agency regulations and statutes in their arbitrations, particularly those handling cases 
involving Federal agencies, but their knowledge has been largely provided by the parties in 
the adversarial arbitral system. Those with recognized expertise in the particular field of law 
might be exempt from such training. 
Arbitration under the proposed system may not assure equally competent 
presentations by both sides. Such inadequacies make it all the more important that 
statutory enforcement arbitrators have the requisite independent statutory knowledge and 
not have to rely on the presenters to secure the information needed to decide cases 
involving legal issues. Such should be an integral part of their training. 
To assure the confidence of the claimants, particular attention should be paid to 
augmenting the current numbers of women and minorities in the arbitration pool. 
Unfortunately, the labor-management arbitration group is not representative of the general 
population in this regard. There should be exploration of a special program by designating 
agencies to recruit and train such individuals to assure the availability of a broader 
selection of acceptable arbitrators. The current shortfall of such individuals might dictate 
waiver of the traditional avenues of entry onto the designating agency panels. 
c. Arbitrator Training 
To provide the specialized knowledge required of such neutrals, it is proposed that we 
establish a comprehensive training program to familiarize the arbitrators with the 
requirements of the regulations and statutes, so that the designating agencies will be able to 
establish rosters of individuals with skills pertinent to the particular issues being arbitrated. 
Training could be provided by the government agency in cities around the country, or 
by the designating agencies themselves utilizing as trainers those who have experience in 
the substantive issues of the law, and the procedural process of arbitration. The designating 
and governmental agencies should jointly develop standards for such training, and permit 
arbitrators who have completed such training to list those courses on their resumes and 
panel cards to demonstrate to potential employers the extent of their expertise. Such training 
could embrace topics such as definitions of disability and reasonable accommodation under 
ADA. physical and emotional aspects of specific disabilities, rules of the EEOC, judicial 
rulings under various discrimination statutes, rules of evidence in arbitration, formulation of 
remedies, etc. For those recruited without prior arbitration experience from the ranks of 
women and minorities, there should also be training in the conduct of arbitration hearings, as 
well as a program of mentoring by established arbitrators before such individuals are added 
to the rosters of the designating agencies. Current requirements of listing a certain number of 
completed labor-management arbitrations should be reexamined for such individuals. 
Arbitrators should be expected to pay for such training which would be directly 
correlated to their acceptability as arbitrators in the substantive areas of training. 
d Arbitrator Selection 
The selection of the arbitrator will be determined by the procedure established by the 
employer in the light of the government agency regulations. Thus, if the regulation requires 
the claimants right to participate in the selection of an arbitrator from a panel developed by a 
designating agency, it would be assumed that the employer's plan would provide for that 
selection, perhaps utilizing a neutral agency of the employers choice to select the panel. If 
the plan calls for the designating agency to appoint the arbitrator from its roster, then that 
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would determine the choice. If the plan calls for alternate selection of names from a provided 
panel, then that would control the choice. 
In some cases, particularly where there has been joint development of the procedures 
with an employee committee, the parties may jointly establish the panel without reliance on 
any designating agency nominations. They may even select a permanent umpire. In the 
event that this system is introduced into collective bargaining relationships, individual 
employees should have the right to participate in the arbitration selection, challenging the 
traditional view of the unions exclusive right to appeal to the arbitration step. 
There should also be recognition that parties may lack awareness of the arbitrators' 
prior decisions that is common in the labor management environment. Listings of prior 
decisions might be set out on the arbitrator's panel card or be provided from agency rosters. 
^Arbitrator Compensation 
The present system of compensation in the labor-management collective bargaining 
field mandates equal cost sharing between the parties. With minor variations that has been 
the universal standard. That mutuality has in turn enhanced the neutrality of the arbitrator as 
being jointly funded by both parties. It has also helped to free the arbitrator from hesitation in 
deciding cases against a party which might be paying the entire bill in that case or with a 
favorable ruling be the source of future work. The risk of non-payment and future recall in 
labor management arbitration lies equally at the feet of both parties. 
Employer promulgated arbitration presumably anticipates employer compensation of 
the arbitrator, with minimal, if any, employee contribution . That in turn raises the issue of 
whether a determination in favor of the employer is more likely to bring promised 
compensation for that case, let alone create a favorable predisposition for future selection 
than would an adverse ruling. 
There are many labor-management arbitrators who are currently performing arbitration 
services in employer promulgated systems on a variety of issues including discipline and 
discharge cases without concern over whether the issue of compensation influences their 
judgment. But there are others who decline such work in the belief that the perception of 
greater employer influence through compensation and the potential for reemployment 
reduces their effectiveness as neutrals. 
Compensation thus becomes an important issue in developing a scheme for statutory 
enforcement arbitration. Ideally, the neutral would be jointly compensated by the 
participants. In most situations the employee lacks the resources for equal funding, and 
since the procedure is geared to avoid the high cost of court litigation, it would be unrealistic 
to require more than a token payment from the employee5. Some employee contribution is 
desirable to filter the volume of complaints, and may be attainable through the arbitrators to 
award attorney fees and costs to a prevailing employee. 
Compensation paid into escrow in advance of the proceeding or provided directly by 
a designating agency without the arbitrator knowing the relative contribution to the funds 
might solve this problem. Partial subsidy by the statutory agency might help to match the 
employer's share while reducing the agency's litigation backlog and costs. Subsidy from 
some independent source might also be obtained. Development of a rational, credible 
compensation system should be addressed by the statutory or designating agencies, with 
the goal of protecting against an arbitrator bias in favor of the major funder. 
^ h e impact of individual right of appeal to arbitration in the presence of a collective bargaining agreement issue 
must be addressed. If the employee is given the personal right of appeal to arbitration, the rationale of union paying 
half when it "co-owns" the grievance would not necessarily apply. 
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f. Arbitrator Responsibility 
Arbitrator authority in the context of statutory enforcement would be driven 
procedurally by standards of due process, and substantively by the regulation or statute 
being invoked. 
Procedural requirements could be established by the statutory agencies authorizing 
the arbitration process, or by the arbitrators in the same manner as the due process 
procedures and shop law in the collective bargaining context. It might be desirable to 
develop a model code of due process procedures for such arbitrations at the request of the 
designating agencies, and perhaps the labor-management bar. If so approached, the 
National Academy of Arbitrators, as sponsors of the arbitrators Code of Professional 
Responsibility, might be receptive to participating in developing a model code of civil 
procedure for such arbitrations. 
In substantive matters the arbitrators would be responsible for adhering to the 
requirements of the pertinent government agency regulations and controlling statutes and 
court decisions. Appellate review would presumably focus on examination of the fairness of 
the arbitration system, with standards of deferral similar to those applied by the court in the 
Gilmer decision. 
Attention should also be paid to the interrelationship between state and federal law 
and the authority of the arbitrator to resolve such conflict of laws issues. In the collective 
bargaining arena, there must also be attention paid to conflicting statutory and contractual 
rights, and the rights of the arbitrator in the two areas. 
6. Implementation 
This proposal offers some suggestions to instill greater equity and fairness in 
employer promulgated systems of arbitration in litigation avoidance systems of statutory 
enforcement. At the same time it seeks to protect the reputation and credibility of the 
institution of arbitration and in particular its manifestation in the field of collective bargaining 
dispute settlement. It is also intended to meet some of the concerns for cheaper, more 
accessible, and more rapid resolution of disputes over issues of discrimination as raised by 
the May 1994 Fact-finding Report of the Dunlop Commission. It may, also provide a means 
of stimulating the development of new employee committees in enterprises deemed so 
important to the stimulation of work place productivity. It requires much discussion, 
organizational commitment and refinement. But it may, if pursued, resolve a number of 
pressing problems of our industrial relations society. 
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